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COMMENTS
IMMIGRATION ARRESTS BY LOCAL POLICE:
INHERENT AUTHORITY OR INHERENTLY
PREEMPTED?
Jill Keblawi'
As a result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President
George W. Bush's Administration has used immigration policy as its
primary weapon in terrorist prevention.' Because there are only two
thousand federal immigration agents and an estimated eight million
undocumented immigrants, this Administration has encouraged the
nation's 650,000 local law enforcement officers to aid in immigration
arrests.2 In line with the Bush Administration's goal of ensuring national
security through tightening immigration laws, Attorney General John
Ashcroft announced on June 6, 2002, that state and local police have the
"inherent authority" to enforce civil and criminal violations of
immigration law, but that such authority should apply only to the
- J.D. Candidate, May 2005. The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. I would like to thank Professor Carlos Ortiz Miranda for his guidance and
instruction throughout the writing process.
1. The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) Interior Enforcement
Strategy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration Border Security, and Claims of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 9 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
Joseph R. Greene, Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service) ("The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 prompted a refocus
of the INS' strategic approach to its law enforcement responsibilities.").
2. Id. John Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Prepared Remarks on the
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (June 6, 2002), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/O60502agpreparedremarks.htm (last visited March
30, 2004) [hereinafter Ashcroft Remarks]. This Comment will use the phrase
"undocumented immigrant" instead of "illegal alien" where possible. See Ruben J.
Garcia, Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187: The Racial Politics of Immigration Law,
17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 118, 118 n.1 (1995). As Garcia stated:
"Alien" is a legal term that defines all noncitizens of the United States. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3). Although the term "illegal aliens" is often used to refer to those
who enter the United States without immigration documents, it further
demonizes undocumented immigrants as lawbreakers and outsiders. In
opposition to this rhetoric, I will throughout this Comment use the term
"undocumented immigrants," unless the term "alien" is more descriptive as a
legal category.
Id.
Catholic University Law Review
"narrow anti-terrorism mission."' This new "inherent authority"
interpretation, contained in a legal opinion written by the Department of
Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), has not been released.4 The
"inherent authority" stance not only contradicts previous OLC opinions,
but also contradicts decades of traditional interpretations of the
immigration power." Further, if a state chooses to accept Ashcroft's
invitation, it may face a great deal of civil rights litigation, and may
undermine both public safety and anti-terrorism investigations.
This Comment first explores the source of the federal power to
regulate immigration. Then, this Comment discusses state immigration
laws that the Supreme Court has struck down for infringing on the
federal power and violating the Equal Protection Clause. This Comment
also examines state laws that the Supreme Court has upheld on the
grounds that they focused on inherently local problems, rather than
federal immigration regulation. Next, this Comment discusses the
legality of state immigration enforcement in light of the federal
preemption doctrine and congressional intent. In doing so, this
Comment analyzes the disparity between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits
on the issue of local enforcement of civil violations of immigration law.
This Comment then argues that the Ninth Circuit properly analyzed the
issue, in light of the origins of the federal immigration power, the Court's
review of state immigration laws, and through examination of federal
immigration policies. This Comment also argues that official actions and
statements from the Executive Branch have demonstrated that the
"inherent authority" stance lacks a firm legal basis. Finally, this
Comment concludes that the Bush Administration's "inherent authority"
opinion is inconsistent with reliable prior law. This Comment further
concludes that this Administration's "inherent authority" doctrine
contravenes public policy because it subjects states to civil rights
litigation and ineffectively combats terrorism.
3. Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 2. The Attorney General stated that "arresting
aliens who have violated . . . civil provisions [of the Immigration and Nationality Act] that
render an alien deportable, and who are listed on the NCIC-is within the inherent
authority of the states." Id.
4. DOJ Legal Opinion Would Broaden Use of State, Local Personnel in Immigration
Enforcement, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 509, 519 (Apr. 8, 2002). In fact, several
advocacy groups have sued the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information
Act to obtain a copy of the opinion. MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI ET AL., MIGRATION POL'Y
INST., AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND
NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 83 (2003).
5. See infra Part I.A-C.
6. See infra Part III.A-B.
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I. AN EXAMINATION OF THE FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POWER AND
STATES' AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE IMMIGRATION LAW
A. The Federal Government Has Exclusive Power To Regulate
Immigration
Although the Constitution does not specifically enumerate the power
to regulate immigration, in Toll v. Moreno, the Supreme Court stated
that the power stemmed from "various sources" in the Constitution and
authority outside the Constitution's text, including the Naturalization
Clause,9 the Foreign Commerce Clause,"' and the federal government's
broad authority over foreign affairs." While the Court has never
determined the precise source of the immigration power, it emphatically
stated, "'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress
more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens.' 2 Each possible
source of power named in Moreno confirmed that any origin of the
immigration power rested exclusively with the federal government.' 3
7. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982).
8. Id. at 10 (stating that the "[flederal authority to regulate the status of aliens
derives from various sources"). The Court further stated, "Our cases have long
recognized the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation
of aliens within our borders." Id.
9. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. The Naturalization Clause states that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power... [t]o establish an [sic] uniform Rule of Naturalization." Id.
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Foreign Commerce Clause states that "[tihe
Congress shall have power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations." Id.
11. Moreno, 458 U.S. at 10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. II (stating that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power... [t]o declare War"); see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp.
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (including the regulation of aliens as one of the powers
inherent in a sovereign nation); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-06
(1889) (justifying the exclusion of Chinese immigrants as part of a nation's inherent
sovereignty).
12. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v.
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)); see id. (applying deferential scrutiny to uphold
Congress's provision that used a gender-based classification).
13. Moreno, 458 U.S. at 10. Because the act of naturalization is only one aspect of
immigration, and fairly straightforward, it will not be discussed in the main text of this
article. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Constitution does not expressly forbid states
from regulating naturalization. Cf U.S. CONST. art. t, § 10 (expressly forbidding state
action in other areas, such as treaty-making); see also Chirac v. Chirac's Lessee, 15 U.S. (2
Wheat.) 259, 269-70 (1817) (suggesting as early as 1817 that states cannot interfere with
this federal power and invalidating a Maryland law that required French citizens to
naturalize in order to become property owners in that state). Chief Justice Marshall stated
"[t]hat the power of naturalization is exclusively in [C]ongress does not seem to be, and
certainly ought not to be, controverted." 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 269; see also United States
v. Wong Kim Ark., 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898) ("The power, granted to Congress by the
Constitution, 'to establish an [sic] uniform rule of naturalization,' was long ago adjudged
by this court to be vested exclusively in Congress."); Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143
U.S. 135, 160 (1892) ("The Constitution has conferred on Congress the right to establish
2004]
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The Foreign Commerce Clause was the first source used to rationalize
the exclusive federal power over the entire immigration field.' 4 In the
Head Money Cases, 5 the Court upheld a federal statute that imposed a
tax on owners of vessels that transported foreign passengers into the
United States.'6 The Court held that the transportation of foreign
passengers was a "part of ... commerce with foreign nations." 7 Thus,
the Head Money Cases became the first Supreme Court decision to hold
that a federal statute regulating immigration was constitutionally valid
under the power to regulate foreign commerce.' The Foreign
an [sic] uniform rule of naturalization, and this right is evidently exclusive, and has always
been held by this court to be so.").
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (empowering Congress to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations"); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 600 (1884) ("Congress [has]
the power to pass a law regulating immigration as a part of commerce of this country with
foreign nations .... ").
15. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
16. Id. at 586, 600. The tax was intended to provide for arriving immigrants and to
"defray the expense of regulating immigration." Id. at 590. The owners of the vessels
brought the suit, claiming the tax was invalid as applied to children. Id. at 589.
17. Id. at 592, 600. In 1824, Justice Marshall defined commerce to include the
transportation of passengers. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 215 (1824) ("[N]o
clear distinction is perceived between the power to regulate vessels employed in
transporting men for hire, and property for hire [for the purposes of Congress's power to
regulate commerce]."). See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712 (1893)
(noting that "[t]he Constitution has granted to Congress the power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, including ... the bringing of persons into the ports of the United
States"). The Head Money Court relied on two prior decisions in which the Court struck
down state taxes on incoming vessels because the laws encroached on the federal power to
regulate foreign commerce. 112 U.S. at 591-593 (citing and discussing The Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. 282,409 (1849) and Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875)).
See also The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 408 ("The act of New York which imposes a tax
on passengers of a ship from a foreign port, in the manner provided, is a regulation of
foreign commerce, which is exclusively vested in Congress; and the act is therefore void.").
18. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 600. In deciding the Passenger Cases, the
Court only achieved a plurality opinion as to the rationale that the localities were
impermissibly regulating foreign commerce. Id. at 592. Then, in Henderson v. Mayor of
New York, the Court decided the same issue as in the Passenger Cases but stated: "A law
or a rule ... which prescribes terms or conditions on which alone the vessel can discharge
its passengers, is a regulation of commerce; and, in case of vessels and passengers coming
from foreign ports, in a regulation of commerce with foreign nations." Henderson, 92 U.S.
259, 271 (1875). The Head Money Cases were different because instead of invalidating a
state law for infringing upon a federal power, the Court upheld a federal law as within that
power. The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 600. The Head Money Court stated:
It cannot be said that [the Passenger Cases and Henderson v. Mayor of New
York] do not govern the present, though there was not then before us any act of
Congress whose validity was in question, for the decisions rest upon the ground
that the State statutes were void only because Congress, and not the States, was
authorized by the Constitution to pass them.
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Commerce Clause, and therefore the immigration power stemming from
it, has been deemed an exclusive power of the federal government."
Case law has distinguished two sources of power from the
government's general authority over foreign affairs, named in Moreno:
2'
1
1) the extra-constitutional concept of inherent sovereignty;2 ' and 2) the
textual authority to declare war.22 Five years after its foreign commerce
jurisprudence, the Court emphasized that the power to exclude
foreigners was inherent in a sovereign nation and not specifically
enumerated in the Constitution.2' In the Chinese Exclusion Case,24 the
Court upheld a federal statute that prohibited Chinese laborers from
entering the United States.2' The Court claimed the power to exclude
19. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 492 (1904). Although the Interstate
Commerce power leaves room for state involvement, the Foreign Commerce power is
plenary. The Buttfield Court stated:
Whatever difference of opinion, if any, may have existed or does exist concerning
the limitations of the power, resulting from other provisions of the Constitution,
so far as interstate commerce is concerned, it is not to be doubted that from the
beginning Congress has exercised a plenary power in respect to the exclusion of
merchandise brought from foreign countries.
Id. The Supreme Court stressed the necessity for consistency in dealings with other
nations and that standardized relations would not be possible if each state acted
individually. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). Justice
Blackmun concluded that "there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the
foreign commerce power to be greater" than that of the Interstate Commerce Clause, and
"[c]ases of this Court, stressing the need for uniformity in treating [] other nations, echo
this distinction." Id. The Court emphasized this point by stating that the federal
government "'must speak with one voice"' when regulating commerce with foreign
entities. Id. at 449. This "one voice" requirement for foreign commerce regulations
indicates the significant extent to which the federal power over immigration is exclusive.
Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 547 (2001) (stating that "[tjhe
Supreme Court's 'one voice' Foreign Commerce Clause jurisprudence is essentially a
jurisprudence of preemption [of state action]").
20. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982).
21. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 29 U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (discussing
the extra-constitutional powers inherent in a sovereign nation).
22. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (stating that the federal
government's "policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with ... the war
power").
23. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889).
24. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
25. Id. at 589, 609. A Chinese laborer, who had been allowed to enter the United
States before this law was enacted, challenged its validity after he was detained for trying
to re-enter the country. Id. at 582.
20041
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aliens as an "incident of sovereignty, ' '26 and said that a nation's ability to
exclude aliens in any manner would diminish its sovereignty.7
This concept was expanded in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp. , in which Justice Sutherland argued that the statement that the
federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically
enumerated in the Constitution holds true only for internal affairs. 9
Sutherland reasoned that while the Constitution's enumerated powers
were "carved from the mass of state powers," the states "never possessed
international powers.""' Instead, the federal government's
unenumerated sovereignty over the realm of foreign affairs passed from
Great Britain to the colonies, not individually, but as a whole.3 ' The
Curtiss-Wright Court specifically included the domain of immigration law
as one of those inherent powers when it stated that the "power to expel
undesirable aliens" was an inherently federal power. 2 The Court further
noted that any powers stemming from the inherent sovereignty of a
nation unmistakably rest exclusively with the federal government.33
More recent cases have returned to the Constitution's text to find
support for the federal government's broad authority over foreign affairsS 34
and immigration regulation. The first case to use Congress' War Power
26. Id. at 609.
27. Id. at 603-04. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-08
(1893) (finding support for the inherent sovereignty position in the writings of
international law commentators).
28. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
29. Id. at 315-16.
30. Id. at 316.
31. Id. Justice Sutherland stated, "As a result of the separation from Great Britain
by the colonies acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown
not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity
as the United States of America." Id.
32. Id. at 318 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893)).
33. Id. at 316; The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (stating that the
power of the United States to exclude aliens "cannot be granted away or restrained on
behalf of any one [sic]").
34. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (finding that federal authority to regulate
immigration derives from U.S. CONST. art t, § 8, cl. 4); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81
n.17 (1976) (declaring that immigration policies are "'intricately woven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power,
and the maintenance of a republican form of government"'); see also Wishnie, supra note
19, at 537-45 (discussing all the Constitution's Foreign Affairs Clauses in relation to the
federal power to regulate immigration). In his article, Wishnie stated:
The Supreme Court often has spoken in sweeping terms of the federal
government's exclusive control of foreign affairs. Historical materials too
support this view. To the extent that the power to regulate immigration arises
from the foreign affairs powers, therefore, the immigration power would seem
similarly to be reserved to the federal government.
[Vol. 53:817
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to justify the deportation of non-citizens did so in "apprehension" of
Communism. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,"' the Court upheld the
government's authority to expel non-citizens because of their
membership in the Communist party.37 The Court reasoned that the
power to deport these non-citizens stemmed from the War Power
because if the United States was at war with a non-citizen's nation, or
had "apprehension of foreign ... dangers short of war," Congress would
have the authority to expel this person." Two decades later, the Court
used the War Power to justify the creation of immigration laws,
regardless of the existence of war or poor relations with other nations.9
Id. at 537-38 (internal footnotes omitted). Because no over-arching general constitutional
grant of a foreign affairs power exists, Wishnie discusses several powers, each of which
constitute foreign affairs powers. Id. at 539. Wishnie asserts that:
The text empowers Congress to declare war and to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations and the Senate to advise and consent on the
appointment of ambassadors; the President is designated as Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces and is authorized to make treaties, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, and to send and receive ambassadors.
Id. Wishnie further asserts that the Constitution itself forbids the states from engaging in
foreign affairs activities, stating:
For example, Article 1, Section 10 provides that "[n]o State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal." On
the other hand, the same section's third clause contains a series of conditional
prohibitions: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... keep Troops,
or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."
Id. at 540.
35. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 581, 587 (1952). See U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 11.
36. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
37. Id. at 581, 596.
38. Id. at 587. The Court stated:
War, of course, is the most usual occasion for extensive resort to the power.
Though the resident alien may be personally loyal to the United States, if his
nation becomes our enemy his allegiance prevails over his personal preference
and makes him also our enemy .... But it does not require war to bring the
power of deportation into existence or to authorize its exercise. Congressional
apprehension of foreign or internal dangers short of war may lead to its use. So
long as the alien elects to continue the ambiguity of his allegiance his domicile
here is held by a precarious tenure. That aliens remain vulnerable to expulsion
after long residence is a practice that bristles with severities. But it is a weapon
of defense and reprisal confirmed by international law as a power inherent in
every sovereign state. Such is the traditional power of the Nation over the alien
and we leave the law on the subject as we find it.
Id. at 587-88.
39. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69, 81 (1976) (upholding a statute that conditioned
non-citizens' eligibility for participation in a medical program on the length of their
residency).
2004]
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S 411In Mathews v. Diaz, the Court reasoned that Congress' decisions
relating to non-immigrants, even if they related to inherently internal
affairs, "may [still] implicate our relations with foreign powers., 4' In
sum, the Supreme Court has held that each power used to justify the
immigration power is exclusively federal, and it has used this rationale to
41establish the plenary nature of the immigration power.
B. States May Make Laws Within Their Police Powers That Have An
Incidental Effect On Undocumented Immigrants
The Supreme Court consistently has struck down state laws that
attempt to regulate immigration on two grounds: violation of the EqualProtctio Cluse nd ederl . 43
Protection Clause and federal preemption. The Supreme Court has
utilized the first ground to invalidate state laws because they
•• 44
unconstitutionally discriminate against non-citizens. Although Yick Wo
v. Hopkins45 was the first case to hold that equal protection applied to
non-citizens, the principle issue in Yick Wo was discrimination based on
40. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
41. Id. at 81.
42. See supra note 13 (discussing cases in which the Court held that Congress has
exclusive authority over the Naturalization Power); Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 587-88 (holding
that the authority to expel non-citizens is justified under the congressional war power and
is "inherent in every sovereign state"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 316 (1936) (holding that under the extra-constitutional theory of "inherent
sovereignty," the immigration power is exclusively federal); The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 591 (1884) (holding that
because the Foreign Commerce Clause is a plenary power, Congress has the exclusive
power to regulate the admission of foreign passengers into the country); see also Wishnie,
supra note 19, at 533 ("[E]ach constituent element of the immigration power is an
exclusively federal power. That the sources of the immigration power are exclusively
federal ... strongly indicates that the immigration power is itself an exclusively federal ...
power.").
43. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371, 372, 377-80 (1971) (striking
down a state law denying unemployment benefits to non-citizens on the grounds of federal
preemption and also on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds). Even before
the federal immigration power was utilized by Congress, the Court struck down state laws
that encroached upon the immigration field. See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92
U.S. 259, 271 (1875); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 282, 409 (1849).
44. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 382-83 (refusing to uphold a state law that violated the
Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against aliens); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-22 (1948) (striking down a state law that unlawfully
discriminated against aliens, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (invalidating a California law for violating the Equal
Protection Clause).
45. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Vick Wo, the Court struck down a California statute that
discriminated against Chinese immigrants in the laundry business. Id. at 374.
[Vol. 53:817
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46
race rather than on immigration status. The Supreme Court did not use
the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a state law that discriminated
based on immigration status until Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commission.47 The Takahashi Court struck down a statute that denied
fishing licenses to non-citizens, reasoning that lawful admittance into the
country entitles an alien to equal protection under state laws.48
In 1971, in Graham v. Richardson,49 the Court fashioned a standard of
review for state laws that discriminate against non-citizens:
"classifications based on alienage ... are inherently suspect and subject
to close judicial scrutiny."" The Court classified non-citizens as a
"discrete and insular minority" to whom strict scrutiny review must
apply."' Thus, while the judiciary defers significantly to Congress' power
to enact federal immigration laws," state laws that discriminate warrant
46. Id. at 374; see also Wishnie, supra note 19, at 504. Wishnie writes: "fa]lthough
Yick Wo settled the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to all 'persons,' regardless
of immigration status, it did so in the context of a claim of race and nationality
discrimination." Id.
47. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
48. Id. at 420. The Court stated, "The Fourteenth Amendment and the laws adopted
under its authority thus embody a general policy that all persons lawfully in this country
shall abide 'in any state' on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-
discriminatory laws." Id. The Court explained that the federal government may classify
non-citizens based on race, but that states have no powers to regulate the condition of a
non-citizen's conduct once the federal government has admitted him into the country. Id.
at 418-19. The Court stated further that the states may not impose "discriminatory
burdens" on non-citizens, including restricting their right to earn a living, once they
lawfully have entered under the federal government's standards. Id. at 419.
49. 403 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1971) (invalidating the state's conditioning of welfare
benefits on a person's immigration status). The Graham Court struck down the state law
on the alternate grounds of federal preemption. Id. at 382-83.
50. Id. at 372. The Court stated, "[w]e conclude that a State's desire to preserve
limited welfare benefits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify" the state's
discrimination against aliens. Id. at 374. Citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633
(1969), the Graham Court asserted:
"[A] State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It
may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public assistance,
public education, or any other program. But a State may not accomplish such a
purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens .... The saving
of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification.
Id. at 374-375.
51. Id. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938)).
52. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)("[Policies towards aliens] are
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune
from judicial inquiry or interference."); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976)
(explaining that state classification of non-citizens for the purposes of denying welfare
benefits cannot be justified, although a comparable federal classification is legitimate).
The Mathews Court reasoned that because federal classifications concerned immigration
20041
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strict scrutiny review."
The Court has used the federal preemption doctrine as an alternative
means of invalidating state legislation that impacts non-citizens.
Although the Court consistently has invalidated state laws that encroach
upon the federal immigration power since the 1800s, the Court did not
expressly address the issue of federal preemption until the late twentieth
century." The question of whether federal immigration law preempts
states from legislating in the same area turns on the field of law that the
state attempts to regulate. The first preemption cases struck down state
laws because they encroached on immigration regulations by burdening
the non-citizens more than the federal laws did, in subjecting them to
further registration requirements or denying them benefits. 7 But the
Court has upheld state legislation if it concerns an inherently local
problem and does not contradict federal immigration policy.8
In De Canas v. Bica,59 the Supreme Court cited the state police powers
to uphold a California state law that penalized employers who hired
policy, and therefore foreign relations, the standard of review to be applied was minimal-
it would be upheld unless "wholly irrational." Id. at 83, 85-87.
53. But see Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 433, 439 (1982) (stating "We have
concluded that strict scrutiny is out of place when the restriction primarily serves a
political function," and noting that one exception to the strict scrutiny standard is that it is
rational for the state to prohibit non-citizens from serving as deputy probation officers);
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979) (noting that a state prohibition against non-
citizens becoming public school teachers survives the rational basis review); Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 293, 300 (1978) (noting it is rational for the state to prohibit non-
citizens from becoming state troopers).
54. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Article VI of the Constitution states, "[t]his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Id.
55. See supra Part I.A (discussing the early invalidation of state immigration laws);
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,378-80 (1971).
56. Compare De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (upholding a state law
because it concerns an inherently local problem of employment), with Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-80 (1971) (striking down a state law because it concerned
denying welfare benefits to non-citizens), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941)
(striking down a state alien registration act).
57. See, e.g., Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 66-68 (invalidating a Pennsylvania law that set
up a registration system for non-citizens in that state); Richardson, 403 U.S. at 377-80
(striking down a state welfare law on federal preemption grounds); see also Allison B.
Feld, Section 434 of the Welfare Act: Does the Federal Immigration Power Collide with the
Tenth Amendment?, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 561 (1997) ("The common thread running
through these cases is the Court's finding that the states' acts intruded upon the broad
federal immigration power by imposing burdens on aliens beyond those imposed by the
federal government.").
58. See De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357.
59. Id.
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illegal immigrants.' In asserting that not all state laws affecting non-
citizens function as attempts to regulate immigration,6 ' the Court
established a three-prong test to determine the constitutionality of such
state legislation.62 First, a state law may not regulate immigration.6' The
Court found that the California statute aimed to strengthen the state's
economic policy, rather than regulate immigration." Second, if the
statute did not regulate immigration, the Court may still invalidate it if
Congress explicitly stated its intent to occupy the field in such a way that
"complete[ly] oust[ed]" state power. 5 The Court found no relevant
congressional statute that explicitly stated such an intent regarding
employment. 6 Third, the state law cannot serve as an "obstacle" to the
federal immigration policies; the Court did not apply this prong of the
test, but remanded it to the lower courtY. The Court ultimately upheld
the law because California's police powers were aimed principally at
60. Id. at 356-57. The California law provides that "(n)o employer shall knowingly
employ an alien who is not entitled to lawful residence in the United States if such
employment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers." Id. at 352 (citing
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a)(1971)).
61. Id. at 355 ("The Court has never held that every state enactment which in any
way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-empted by this
constitutional power. whether latent or exercised.").
62. See id. at 354-57, 363.
63. Id. at 354. De Canas defined a regulation of immigration as "essentially a
determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain." Id. at 355.
64. Id. at 355. The Court stated that:
In this case, California has sought to strengthen its economy by adopting federal
standards in imposing criminal sanctions against state employers who knowingly
employ aliens who have no federal right to employment within the country; even
if such local regulation has some purely speculative and indirect impact on
immigration, it does not thereby become a constitutionally proscribed regulation
of immigration that Congress itself would be powerless to authorize or approve.
Id. at 355-56.
65. Id. at 356, 357. The Court explained that evidence of a "complete ouster" can be
demonstrated by the text of a statute or in its legislative history. Id. at 357-58.
66. Id. at 358. The Court found no statute or legislative history of the INA that
supported the Respondents' claim. Id. Further, the Court found that it could not infer
Congress's intent, stating:
Nor can such intent be derived from the scope and detail of the INA. The
central concern of the INA is with the terms and conditions of admission to the
country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country. The
comprehensiveness of the INA scheme for regulation of immigration and
naturalization, without more, cannot be said to draw in the employment of illegal
aliens as "plainly within ... [that] central aim of federal regulation."
Id. at 359.
67. Id. at 363, 364-65
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preserving the local labor market for legally present immigrants and
citizens, and because the law was ancillary to the field of immigration.6
In the De Canas Court's discussion of police powers, it conceded some
limited immigration powers to the states.69 Less than a decade later,
however, the Court reasserted the plenary power of the federal
government.7" In Plyler v. Doe,7' the Supreme Court limited the
authority of the states to make legislation impacting undocumented
immigrants when it struck down a Texas statute that encouraged public
schools to deny education to undocumented immigrant children.7 ' The
Court held that Texas's use of its police powers to preserve resources for
its legal citizens was insufficient to justify discriminating against
undocumented children; the use of police powers for this purpose did not
correspond to any federal immigration policy.73  Even though Plyler
68. Id. at 355-56, 363. The Court characterized the police power as one in which the
"state law is fashioned to remedy local problems." Id. at 363. The Court rationalized that
the California law was policing local employers; the law did not impair the federal interest
in foreign affairs because it concerned individuals whom the federal government had
already declared cannot work in this country. Id. at 355-56. Finally, the Court stated that,
"States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment
relationship to protect workers within the State." Id. at 356.
69. Id. at 358-59. See also Bert C. Buzan & George M. Dery III, California's
Resurrection of the Poor Laws: Proposition 187, Preemption, and the Peeling Back of the
Hollow Onion of Immigration Law, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 141, 156 (1996). Buzan and
Dery state:
Thus, in De Canas, the Court rather generously read their newly created three-
pronged test in favor of the states. California was seen as merely exercising its
broadly defined police powers to handle an essentially local problem.
Conversely, Congress was viewed as leaving an area of law dealing with alienage
to the states, despite its enactment of a detailed and comprehensive statutory
scheme.
Id.
70. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (restricting the states' police powers in
holding that a state university that imposed discriminatory tuition charges based on
immigration status violated the Supremacy Clause); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In
Moreno, the State of Maryland attempted to assert that it merely was mirroring the
federal government's policies. Moreno, 458 U.S. at 10-11. The Court stated, "[in seeking
to defend the statute, the State argued that it had 'simply followed the Federal
Government's lead' in classifying certain persons as 'ineligible for citizenship'." Id. The
Moreno Court rejected outright this argument, explaining the distinct roles of the federal
and state governments in the immigration field. Id. at 11.
71. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
72. Id. at 230. This case was primarily decided on equal protection grounds. See id.
at 210-17.
73. Id. at 226; see also Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal
Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939, 989-92 (1995) (including an analysis of what
constitutes legitimate state interests). State police powers are "assert[ed] as a valid
independent state interest" for the purposes of judicial review of state action in the
immigration realm. Id. at 989. Manheim, however, finds that the only legitimate state
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acknowledged the De Canas Court's concession of federal power,74 it
indicated that the Court was moving away from the requirement of
explicit congressional intent in order to find a preemption of state law."
C. Federal Policy Allows States a Limited Concurrent Power To Make
Immigration Arrests
In some statutes, Congress has manifested its clear intent by expressly
delegating authority to the states to enforce immigration law. M In
instances where the immigration violation stems from the non-citizen's
criminal behavior, and not merely the non-citizen's unlawful presence,
Congress has delegated authority to local police to make arrests." In
particular, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) allows states to arrest non-citizens who have committed the
interest the Court has upheld is that asserted in De Canas, the "adverse impact on the
domestic labor force." Id. at 990. One state law was struck down because the Court found
the proffered state interest to be illusory; the Tayyari Court struck down a law that
attempted to bar Iranian students from state universities at the time of the Hostage Crisis
in Iran for concern of physical safety. Tayyari v. New Mexico State Univ., 495 F. Supp.
1365, 1367 (D.M. 1980); Manheim, supra at 989. The Tayyari Court found that the "true
purpose" of the state's law was to "make a political statement" about Iranian students.
Tayyari, 495 F. Supp. at 1376; Mahheim, supra at 989-90. The Plyler Court rejected the
claim that a legitimate interest of Texas was improving the educational environment for
lawful residents by excluding undocumented children from school. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226;
Mahheim, supra at 990.
74. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225 (noting that "the States do have some authority to act with
respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a
legitimate state goal"). The Court manifested its desire to restrict the De Canas decision
to the scope of Congress's intention to bar employment to undocumented immigrants. Id.;
see also Buzan & Dery, supra note 69, at 156.
75. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224-25. The Court found that even though Congress did not
expressly preempt the field of withholding education from undocumented children, it
would consider the state law invalid on preemption grounds precisely because Congress
was silent on the discrimination against undocumented children. Id. at 226. The Plyler
Court stated, "[W]e perceive no national policy that supports the State in denying these
children an elementary education." Id. at 226.
76. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.
L. 104-132, § 439, 110 Stat. 1276 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2000)); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (2000); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C. 1357 (2000); Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §
1103(a)(10) (Supp. 2003).
77. See, e.g., AEDPA § 439, 8 U.S.C. § 1252c. State enforcement of non-citizen's
criminal behavior falls within the realm of a state's police powers. Cf. Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958). The Miller Court supports the proposition that a state
police officer is authorized to arrest a person in violation of a federal criminal law. Id.; see
also Linda Reyna Yafiez & Alfonso Soto, Local Police Involvement in the Enforcement of
Immigration Law, 1 HISP. L.J. 9, 38 (1994) (noting that "under the state police power, law
enforcement agents can make arrests for criminal acts").
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federal immigration crime of illegal re-entry and have been previously
deported as a felon, but not those who are merely illegally present .7
Congress also has delegated arrest authority in a statute that
establishes a number of criminal penalties for immigration offenses.79
The statute states:
No officer or person shall have authority to make any arrests
for a violation of any provision of this section except officers
and employees of the Service designated by the Attorney
General, either individually or as a member of a class, and all
other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws.""
The authorization, limited to this section of the Act, serves as an express
delegation of authority to local police."'
Other congressional legislation delegates arrest authority in limited
situations. The Attorney General can enter into a written agreement,
called a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), with an individual
state to deputize and train state officials in federal immigration law. 3
The agreement must certify that the deputized officers received
"adequate training" in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. 4
The Attorney General can also delegate arrest authority to local police in
the event of an immigration emergency, termed a "mass influx" of
undocumented immigrants.83
78. AEDPA § 439. The law provides that "State and local law enforcement officials
are authorized to arrest and detain an individual who-(1) is an alien illegally present in
the United States; and (2) has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States."
Id.
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (citing the immigration offense of "[b]ringing in and harboring
certain aliens").
80. § 1324(c) (emphasis added).
81. See Estate of Bell v. Comm'r, 928 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Congress is
presumed to act intentionally and purposely when it includes language in one section but
omits it in another."); 73 AM. JUR. 2D. Statutes § 129 (2003) (explaining the canon of
statutory interpretation expressio unius est excusio alterius, which means that the express
"mention of one thing in a statute" implies the exclusion of another); CHISHTI, supra note
4, at 81 (explaining that "there is no similar express general grant of authority to make
arrests for civil violations, and some criminal provisions do not specifically authorize state
or local enforcement").
82. See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2000); Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §
1103(a)(10) (Supp. 2003).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) ("[T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement
with a State... [allowing an officer of the State who is qualified] to perform a function of
an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens
in the United States.").
84. § 1357(g)(2). Further, these local police "shall be subject to the direction and
supervision of the Attorney General." § 1357(g)(3).
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1 103(a)(10). This provision states:
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When Congress has not manifested its intent to preempt state
immigration enforcement-and the Court is unable or unwilling to infer
it-the Court has held that states can enforce immigration law when a
violation falls within their police powers, or when combating an
86inherently local problem. In accordance with the states' police powers,
law enforcement officers can make arrests for criminal acts.8 7 Because
states can also enforce federal laws, it follows that states, with some
limitations, can enforce criminal immigration laws. 8 The federal courts
of appeal maintain this position. 9
Although states have the authority to make criminal immigration
arrests, Gonzales v. City of Peoria9" enumerates limitations on this
In the event that the Attorney General determines that an actual or imminent
mass influx of aliens arriving off the coast of the United States, or near a land
border, presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal response,
the Attorney General may authorize any State or local law enforcement officer,
with the consent of the head of the department, agency, or establishment under
whose jurisdiction the individual is serving, to perform or exercise any of the
powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this chapter or regulations
issued thereunder upon officers or employees of the Service.
Id. This authority was used only in August 1994, when 30,000 Cuban and Haitian refugees
fled to Florida's shores. Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal
Aliens, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 26 (1996) [hereinafter OLC Opinion].
86. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
356 (1976); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("So we start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.").
87. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958). The Miller Court stated that
in the "circumstance of an arrest for violation of federal law by state peace officers, that
the lawfulness of the arrest ... is to be determined by reference to state law." Id. In other
words, federal law does not prohibit state police officers from arresting violators of federal
criminal laws; the only limitation is state law. See id. State enforcement of non-citizen's
criminal behavior falls within the realm of a state's police powers. Yafiez, supra note 77,
at 38 (noting that "under the state police power, law enforcement agents can make arrests
for criminal acts").
88. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958): United States
v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1295 (10th Cir. 1999);
Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474. But see Manheim, supra note 73, at 980. Manheim asks:
Is there anything about federal immigration laws that counsel a different result?
For one thing, criminal enforcement is direct regulation; its sole object is to
implement immigration statutes. Unlike narcotics trafficking, for instance,
immigration is not an area where state and federal governments have concurrent
interests and power.
Id. Two federal district courts, in Arkansas and Washington, disagree with this
proposition as they have permanently enjoined local enforcement of immigration laws
with consent decrees. Id. at 979 n.279.
90. 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983).
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power." One of these limitations distinguishes between the civil and
criminal aspects of immigration law, which determines the arrest
authority of local police." This limitation exists out of concern that local
police may not understand the difference between criminal and civil
violations of immigration law.9' In Gonzales, the confusion among the
police of the City of Peoria centered on the term "illegal alien," which
appeared in their department policies; the term "obscure[d] the
distinction between civil and criminal violations., 94 The Peoria police
interpreted it to mean both "an alien who has illegally entered the
country, which is a criminal violation under section 1325" and also "an
alien who is illegally present in the United States, which is only a civil
violation." 95 An illegally present alien has not committed a crime, but
merely has violated a technical provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).96 The Gonzales court gave examples of technical
91. Id. at 475-77.
92. Id. at 476. The second limitation on state enforcement of immigration law is the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable cause. See id. at 475-77. The probable
cause must be based on a belief that the person has violated a criminal provision of the
INA. Id. at 476-77. Probable cause cannot be based on ethnic appearance, lack of
documentation or an admission of illegal presence. See id. at 476-77; United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975) (deciding that the apparent Mexican ancestry
of a car's occupants did not constitute reasonable grounds for police officers to conclude
the occupants were aliens). State law serves as the third limitation. See Gonzales, 722
F.2d at 475. States cannot make immigration arrests without state law granting local
police the "affirmative authority to make arrests under [federal] statutes." Id. at 475; see
also Vazquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1296 (noting expressly the condition of state law
allowing immigration arrests); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Missouri, the "War on Terrorism,"
and Immigrants: Legal Challenges Post 9/11, 67 Mo. L. REV. 775, 792-94 (2002) (analyzing
Missouri state law to determine whether state police can make immigration arrests); OLC
Opinion, supra note 85 (analyzing California state law to determine whether local police
can enforce immigration law).
93. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 476 ("Many of the problems.., have derived from a failure
to distinguish between civil and criminal violations of the Act."); see also Manheim, supra
note 73, at 975 ("State enforcement of federal immigration laws also presupposes that
local officials are competent to determine immigration status."); see also Lynn Tramonte,
Justice Department Seeks New Role for State and Local Police, 23 REFUGEE REP. 6,
(2002), available at http://www.refugees.org/word/articles/RR-August 2002_lead.cfm
(citing examples of civil immigration violations and criminal immigration violations). Civil
violations include "staying in the United States longer than the time period indicated on
one's visa, or living in the United States without the proper documentation," while
criminal violations "include document fraud, marriage fraud, and illegal entry after
deportation." Id. Civil immigration violators "are put into special administrative law
proceedings outside of the criminal justice system." Id. Criminal violators, on the other
hand are put into criminal proceedings and are subject to incarceration. Id.
94. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 476.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1202(g)(1). This provision states that the visa of an alien
admitted to the country on a non-immigrant visa "shall be void beginning after the
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civil violations, including "expiration of a visitor's visa, change of student
status, or acquisition of prohibited employment."9'7 Gonzales mandated
that state officers must understand the distinction between criminal and
civil violations in order to enforce even criminal provisions of the INA.99
Thus, although the courts have held that the enforcement of INA
criminal violations fall well within a state's police powers, a police officer
must first distinguish a criminal violation from a civil one."
Two circuits disagree as to whether this rationale extends to allow local
police enforcement of the civil provisions of the INA."" Currently,
federal immigration law does not give local police clear authority to
make civil immigration arrests."" However, U.S. Congressman Charles
Norwood of Georgia has proposed a bill, the Clear Law Enforcement for
Criminal Aliens Act (CLEAR Act), that would make explicit Congress's
intent to authorize local police to enforce civil immigration law."" The
CLEAR Act would not only encourage police to make such arrests, but
would also require states to enact statutes that expressly authorize such
arrests.")3 No current statute manifests congressional intent as clearly as
conclusion of such period of stay." Id. The violation of such a provision would not render
this alien criminally liable. See Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 476.
97. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 476.
98. Id. at 477. The court stated that, "[i]n implementing the arrest authority granted
by state law, local police must be able to distinguish between criminal and civil violations
and the evidence pertinent to each." Id. The court recommended that "this may require
refinements of both the written policies and officer training programs." Id.
99. E.g., id.
100. The Ninth Circuit has held that the rationale does not extend that far and that
local police are only authorized to enforce criminal violations. Id. at 476. The Tenth
Circuit has, however, extended the rationale to the civil provisions. See United States v.
Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Salinas-Calderon,
728 F.2d. 1298, 1302 (10th Cir. 1984). Other circuits have remained silent on this issue.
101. See e.g. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.
L. 104-132, § 439, 110 Stat. 1276 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2000)); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (2000) (granting local police the authority to arrest only criminal aliens who are
illegally present); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2000) (delegating arrest authority for immigration offenses
carrying criminal penalties); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10)
(Supp. 2003) (permitting local police to arrest civil and criminal immigration violators, but
only during an immigration emergency).
102. Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act of 2003,
H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. § 101 (2003). Section 101 of the CLEAR Act states, "law
enforcement personnel of a State or a political subdivision of a State are fully authorized
to investigate, apprehend, detain, or remove aliens in the United States . . . in the
enforcement of the immigration laws of the United States." Id.
103. H.R. 2671 § 102. Section 102 states that any state "that fails to have in effect a
statute that expressly authorizes law enforcement" to enforce immigration laws, "shall not
receive any of the funds that would otherwise be allocated to the State under section
241(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1231(i))." Id.
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this proposed bill.""' Thus, the courts have based their analysis of the
enforcement issue on the principles of field preemption, which allows
local police to validly enforce federal statutes so long as enforcement
would "not impair federal regulatory interests."'
In Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case brought by "[e]leven
persons of Mexican descent," who challenged the authority of local
police to make federal immigration arrests, claiming that federal law• 106
preempted state action. The Gonzales court decided that the
preemption question rested on the "nature of the regulated subject
matter;" thus, it distinguished between the criminal and civil provisions
of the INA . 7  The court asserted that the INA's "pervasive" and
"complex administrative structure" evidenced congressional intent to
preclude states from enforcing the Act's civil provisions."' Then, the
court distinguished the criminal provisions as being "few in number and
relatively simple in their terms."' 0 9 The court further noted that in the
criminal immigration field, federal and local authorities "have identical
purposes" in preventing crimes."0 Thus, in Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit
104. See, e.g., AEDPA § 439 (granting local police the authority to arrest only criminal
aliens who are illegally present); IIRIRA § 133 (delegating arrest authority for
immigration offenses carrying criminal penalties); INA § 1103(a)(10) (allowing local
police to arrest civil and criminal immigration violators, but only in an immigration
emergency).
105. See Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474; Fl. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142 (1963) ("The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate,
or the state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without
impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at similar
or different objectives."); OLC Opinion, supra note 85 ("It is well-settled that state law
enforcement officers are permitted to enforce federal statutes where such enforcement
activities do not impair federal regulatory interests."); see also People v. Barajas, 81 Cal.
App. 3d 999, 1006 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). The Barajas Court stated:
The supremacy clause is a two-edged sword, and in the absence of a limitation,
the states are bound by it to enforce violations of the federal immigration laws.
The statutory law of the United States is part of the law of each state just as if it
were written into state statutory law.
Id.
106. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 472, 474.
107. Id. at 474.
108. Id. at 474, 475. The court explained that "federal law does not preclude local
enforcement of the criminal provisions of the [Immigration and Naturalization] Act," but
the civil provisions of the INA "constitute such a pervasive regulatory scheme, as would
be consistent with the exclusive federal power over immigration." Id. at 475. The Court
named some of these civil provisions, including "regulating authorized entry, length of
stay, residence status, and deportation." Id. at 474-75.
109. Id. at 475.
110. Id. at 474.
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sustained local enforcement of criminal immigration laws and asserted
the federal preemption of enforcement of the civil immigration laws."'
In deciding United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, the Tenth Circuit's
rationale regarding local authority to make civil immigration arrests
diverged from the Ninth Circuit's analysis."' 2 In Vasquez-Alvarez, the
defendant challenged the police officer's arrest authority, claiming that it
did not comport with the AEDPA amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1252c
because the arresting officer did not confirm with the INS that the
defendant was a felon who had illegally reentered the country."' The
officer made his decision to arrest Vasquez "based solely on the fact that
[he]" was illegally present-a civil immigration violation-without
knowledge of Vazquez's previous felony and deportation, which, with his
additional re-entry, amounted to a violation of the criminal provision in
Section 1252c." 4 The defendant further claimed that Section 1252c "sets
forth the only circumstances under which a state or local law
enforcement official can arrest for violations of federal immigration
laws," and thus, any state enforcement not conforming with Section
1252c was preempted.' 15 Disagreeing with the defendant, the court held
that Section 1252c did not limit the "preexisting" arrest authority of local
police; rather, it "merely create[d]" an additional way to make
immigration arrests. ' 6 The Tenth Circuit based its reasoning on the
principle that local police can enforce violations of federal law, as long as
state law grants such authority.' The court then cited its proposition
made in United States v. Salinas-Calderon'18 that "state law-enforcement
111. Id. at 474-75.
112. United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999).
113. Id. at 1295. An INS officer had contacted the local police because he was
suspicious of Vasquez-Alvarez's immigration status, but when the police officer arrested
Vasquez-Alvarez, he did not contact the INS to determine whether he was a prior felon.
Id. at 1295, 1296.
114. Id. See also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
Pub. L. 104-132, § 439, 110 Stat. 1276 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2000)).
The defendant was in violation of this statute because he previously had been convicted of
a felony, and at the time of the arrest, was illegally present. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at
1296.
115. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1295.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 728 F.2d. 1298, 1301 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that a state trooper had probable
cause to investigate a situation in which a driver appeared to be bringing illegal aliens into
the country). The Salinas-Calderon court stated in dicta that "[a] state trooper has general
investigatory authority to inquire into possible immigration violations." Id. at 1301 n.3.
Although this language is broad, the arrest actually stemmed from 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2), a
criminal violation. 728 F. 2d at 1300. The case's central question was whether the police
officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Id.; see also Lazos Vargas, supra note
92, at 784 (explaining that Salinas is generally cited as "going to the appropriateness of
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officers have the general authority to investigate and make arrest for
violations of federal immigration laws."' 9 The Vasquez-Alvarez court
attacked the defendant's preemption argument by analyzing the plain
words and the legislative history of Section 1252c.'2° The court asserted
that the purpose of Section 1252c was to "displace a perceived federal
limitation on the ability" of local police to make immigration arrests.2 '
Thus, the Tenth Circuit understood that local police have a general
authority to make immigration arrests-a position inconsistent with that
of the Ninth Circuit.
22
In addition to expressly delegated authority and congressional intent
to preempt state police powers, examining the actions of the Executive
Branch helps determine whether states can enforce immigration law.
23
For example, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) can regulate when necessary to enforce its functions under
statute. 124 As one commentator noted, "[wihen valid in scope and issued
probable cause for a stop when an officer has reason to suspect that the driver is an illegal
immigrant").
119. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1296.
120. Id. at 1297-98. In particular, the court cited Representative Doolittle's reasons
for amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252c to allow state enforcement. Id. at 1298. Doolittle had
stated that "[w]ith such a threat to our public safety posed by criminal aliens .... I was
dismayed to learn that the current Federal law prohibits State and local law enforcement
officials from arresting and detaining criminal aliens whom they encountered through
their routine duties." Id. (citing 142 CONG. REC. 4619 (1996) (comments of Rep.
Doolittle)).
121. Id. at 1298-99.
122. Compare id. at 1296 (stating that "state law-enforcement officers have the general
authority to investigate and make arrest for violations of federal immigration laws"), with
Gonzales v. City of Peoria 722 F.2d 468, 474-75 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that the civil
provisions of the INA are consistent with the federal power over immigration and, thus,
are preempted).
123. Cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("The question in
each case is what the purpose of Congress was."). Congressional intent to preempt state
police powers can be determined in a number of ways. Id. One way to determine
congressional intent is to examine the regulations promulgated by the Executive Branch.
Id. In particular, the Santa Fe Elevator Corp. Court stated, "[t]he scheme of federal
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it." Id.; See also Yafiez & Soto, supra note 77, at 22
(arguing that "Congressional intent can be determined from express statutory language or
inferred from various sources"). Yafiez and Soto suggest that "[l]egislative history,
occupation of the area, uniform enforcement, and the conflict between federal and state
law are potential sources of inference in support of congressional preemptive intent." Id.
124. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2003); Press Release, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security Facts for March 1, 2003, at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=&content=817&print=true. Until recently,
federal immigration authority was vested with the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service, a division within the Department of Justice. Id. As of March 1, 2003, all
immigration authority shifted to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Id. The
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in accordance with congressional guidance, these regulations can
preempt state action in a particular field. 1 2 5 In addition, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) previously has issued advisory opinions guiding states
on the enforcement of immigration laws.1 26 In 1996, the DOJ issued an
opinion that stated, "State police lack recognized legal authority to arrest
or detain aliens solely for the purposes of civil deportation proceedings,
as opposed to criminal prosecution."'27  Thus, until the recent DOJ
announcement, the Executive Branch's understanding of this area of
immigration law traditionally has been consistent with case law stemming
from the Gonzales case.128
immigration enforcement authority is now housed in the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), within DHS. Id.
125. Yafiez & Soto, supra note 77, at 36. See also Fid. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) ("Federal regulations have no less pre-emptive
effect than federal statutes."). The De La Cuesta Court explained that if the
administrative agency intended to preempt state law, and if this action was within its
congressionally delegated powers, the preemption is valid. Id. at 153-54.
126. The most recent advisory opinion dates from 1996. OLC Opinion, supra note 85.
The one previous to that was an advisory opinion from 1989. See id. at 31 (citing
Memorandum for Joseph R. Davis, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
from Douglas W. Kmiec, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re:
Handling of INS Warrants of Deportation in Relation to NCIC Wanted Persons File (Apr.
11, 1989)). A Department of Justice press release from 1978 stated a similar policy.
Yafiez & Soto, supra note 77, at 36 n.202; see also id. at 36 ("The most clear direction from
the federal government on the role of states in immigration enforcement has come in the
form of Department of Justice Press Releases.").
127. OLC Opinion, supra note 85, at 27; see also CHISHTI, supra note 4, at 85 (pointing
out that the 1996 amendments were adopted only a few months after the OLC's legal
opinion, which stated that local police lack the authority to arrest people on civil
immigration violations). Chishti further noted that "[i]f Congress had intended to alter
the Executive's interpretation of the INA, it would likely have granted the states broad
civil enforcement authority expressly, which it did not." Id.
128. See OLC Opinion, supra note 85, at 32 ("[W]e conclude that state and local police
lack recognized legal authority to stop and detain an alien solely on suspicion of civil
deportability, as opposed to a criminal violation of the immigration laws or other laws.");
id. (citing Memorandum for Joseph R. Davis, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, from Douglas W. Kmiec, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, Re: Handling of INS Warrants of Deportation in Relation to NCIC Wanted
Persons File (Apr. 11, 1989)). In addition, a 1978 Justice Department Press Release stated
that local police should not detain "any person not suspected of a crime, solely on the
ground that they may be deportable aliens." Yafiez & Soto, supra note 77, at 36. It further
"advised against police involvement in immigration enforcement, unless it occurred
through incidental brushes with undocumented aliens arrested on independent state
grounds." Id.
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D. The Legal Landscape Prior to the Announcement of the "Inherent
Authority" Opinion
As the Supreme Court's jurisprudence consistently has held for an
exclusive federal power over immigration, the Court has struck down any
state law that impairs federal immigration policy.'2 9  Because the
Supreme Court has remained silent as to whether states can enforce
immigration law, the issue should be approached by examining
congressional intent.' Local enforcement of the immigration power has
been authorized in limited instances by congressional statute.'3 ' Yet, by
expressly authorizing local police to make civil immigration arrests, the
proposed CLEAR Act would give substance to the Tenth Circuit's
position that such arrests are not preempted.12  Thus, these conflicting
positions on the question of preemption constitute the legal setting in
which to examine the "inherent authority" position.'
3
II. THE "INHERENT AUTHORITY" POSITION HAS CONFUSED
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND RELIES ON VAGUE TENTH CIRCUIT
OPINIONS
A. The Administration's Own Officials Have Taken Actions Inconsistent
with the OLC's "Inherent Authority" Position
On June 6, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the
Office of Legal Counsel's conclusion that state and local police have the
"inherent authority" to arrest "aliens who have violated criminal
provisions of Immigration and Nationality Act or civil provisions that
render an alien deportable, and who are listed on the [National Crime
and Information Center (NCIC) database].' 34 Ashcroft further stated
129. See supra Parts L.A and I.B.
130. See supra Part I.C (discussing congressional intent, and, due to absence of
Supreme Court cases on the issue, examining federal circuit court opinions).
131. See supra Part I.C.
132. Compare Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act,
H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. (2003) ("[R]eaffirming the existing general authority, law
enforcement personnel of a State . . . are fully authorized to investigate, apprehend,
detain, or remove aliens in the United States ... in the enforcement of the immigration
laws of the United States"), with United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1296
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that local police have the "general authority ... [to] make arrests
for violations of federal immigration laws").
133. Seeinfra Part.II.A-B.
134. Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 2. See generally Federal Bureau of Investigation,
National Crime Information Center (NCIC), at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dojfbi/
is/ncic.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2004). The National Crime and Information Center
database is "a computerized index of criminal justice information" including criminal
records, wanted persons, stolen properties, and missing persons. Id.; see also Letter from
American Civil Liberties Union, et. al., to Mitch E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of
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that the Justice Department was asking the states to utilize their
"inherent authority" for the "anti-terrorism mission."'3 5  Various
Administration officials, in their attempts to explain and implement the
"inherent authority" policy only have served to muddle the meaning of
the OLC's interpretation. 1 6  These officials not only contradict each
other, but also leave the public unsure of the policy's legal basis.1
3 7
In response to an inquiry about the inherent-authority policy, White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales narrowly interpreted the policy in a
manner consistent with the states' general police powers to arrest
criminals.'" Referring to the position taken by the DOJ Office of Legal
Counsel, Gonzales stated that local police have the "inherent authority"
to arrest "only [those] high-risk aliens who fit a terrorist profile" and who
are "in violation of immigration laws."'3"  Gonzales suggested that he
interpreted the OLC's conclusion to mean that state and local police
have the "inherent authority" to arrest an alien when they have both
violated immigration law and have a criminal record-one that fits a
terrorist profile-on the NCIC database. 41' This position seems to reflect
Congress's intent in 8 U.S.C. § 1252c, which authorizes local officials to
arrest only those illegally-present aliens who have committed a crime.14
Thus, the White House Counsel's interpretation would limit the meaning
of the OLC policy to reflect the Ninth Circuit's position that local police
have inherent authority to arrest only criminal aliens.1
42
Management and Budget (April 8, 2003), available at
http://www.aclu.org/CriminalJustice/CriminaliJustice.cfm?l D=1 2306&c=15 (last visited
Jan. 30, 2004) (asserting that the NCIC is accessed by federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies across the country an average of 2.8 million times a day).
135. Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 2.
136. See Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to Demetrios G.
Papademetriou, Migration Policy Institute (June 24, 2002), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/files/whitehouse.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Alberto R.
Gonzales]; INS signs Agreement with Florida to Authenticate State, Local Officers to
Perform Immigration Enforcement Functions, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1113, 1120
(July 29, 2002) (discussing the Memorandum of Understanding between Florida and the
INS).
137. Michele Waslin, Immigration Enforcement by Local Police: The Impact on the
Civil Rights of Latinos, 9 NCLR ISSUE BRIEF at 3 (Feb. 2003) (stating that the
contradictory statements have confused "immigrant communities, immigrant and civil
rights advocates, and law enforcement agencies").
138. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 136.
139. Id.
140. Id. Gonzales stated that "state and local police have inherent authority to arrest
and detain persons who are in violation of immigration laws and whose names have been
placed in the [NCIC database]." Id. According to Gonzales, "only high-risk aliens who fit
a terrorist profile will be placed in [NCIC's database]." Id.
141. See supra note 78 for the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2000).
142. See Waslin, supra note 137, at 3.
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The second action by the Administration that fundamentally
contradicted the OLC's position occurred on July 19, 2002, when the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) announced it had
entered into a formal agreement with the State of Florida.43  In this
agreement, called a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), the
Department of Justice agreed to authorize local police officers in Florida
to enforce immigration law, pursuant to section 133 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA).' 44 Under the Florida MOU:
[T]he authority to enforce federal immigration laws does not
extend to the more conventional enforcement actions that the
INS carries out every day in Florida. State law enforcement
officers covered by the MOU will not be involved in
immigration enforcement activities that do not involve
terrorism or domestic security issues.
145
Here, the MOU specified that not all enforcement activities were being
delegated to Florida, but only those involving national security. 146 This
statement suggested that Florida had no authority outside the MOU to
make civil immigration arrests.47 Thus, this agreement directly conflicted
with the DOJ's announcement, which suggested that states have
enforcement authority for all immigration violations. 4' In addition, if
Florida understood that it had "inherent authority" in immigration
enforcement, it would not have entered into a written agreement that
would have served to limit any of its enforcement powers. 149 The INS
clearly did not believe Florida had any "inherent authority;" otherwise, it
143. Id. In July 2002, the State of Florida became the first state to enter into a MOU
with the INS. Id.
144. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2000) ("[T]he Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with
a State ... [allowing an officer of the State who is qualified] to perform a function of an
immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in
the United States.").
145. Waslin, supra note 137, at 5.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 3, 5.
148. Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 2. Although Ashcroft stated that the inherent
authority would not be used "beyond our narrow anti-terrorism mission," he clearly stated
that arresting aliens who have violated criminal and civil provisions of the INA "is within
the inherent authority of the states." Id.
149. See Police May Soon Be Able to Arrest Illegal Immigrants, FLORIDA TIMES-
UNION (Mar. 4, 2002), available at http://www.jacksonville.com/tuonline/apnews/stories/
030402/D711J0600.html. Florida Domestic Security Chief Steve Lauer said that he
"expects the state to join an unprecedented relationship with the federal government that
would allow police to arrest illegal immigrants." Id. Another officer would like even
more authority delegated to the state police: Florida Law Enforcement Commissioner Tim
Moore stated, "It's a start. Ideally, we would like even more authority." Id.
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would not have entered into an MOU only one month after Ashcroft's
announcement. 50
In sum, the three inconsistent messages the Administration has given
the public are: 1) states have the inherent authority to enforce both civil
and criminal immigration law;" ' 2) states have the inherent authority to
arrest illegal and criminal aliens;112 and 3) states have no inherent
authority at all, but must enter into a formal written agreement with the
Department of Justice to make civil immigration arrests. '53 These
contradictions suggest that even the federal government remains unsure
of any legal basis that would support the new "inherent authority" policy.
B. Comparing the Circuits: State Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law
That state police powers include local enforcement of criminal
immigration law remains undisputed.1 14 However, the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits disagree as to whether the INA's civil provisions preempt state
powers."' In addressing state involvement in the immigration field, the
Supreme Court always has adhered to the principle that the "[p]ower to
regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.
' '
1
56
When the Supreme Court conducted its preemption analysis in De Canas
and Plyler, it balanced the federal government's exclusive power over
immigration with the state's police powers. 5 7 Although the issues facing
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits differed factually from the Supreme Court
cases, a preemption analysis still was warranted.58 Thus, the Court's De
Canas three-prong test, together with its Plyler decision, serve as guides
150. Compare 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES, 1113, 1120 (July 29, 2002), with Ashcroft
Remarks, supra note 2. The MOU was entered into in July 2002, one month after the
announcement of the "inherent authority" position. Compare 79 INTERPRETER
RELEASES, 1113, 1120 (July 29, 2002), with Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 2.
151. Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 2.
152. Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 136.
153. See 79 Interpreter Releases, 1113, 1120 (July 29, 2002) (discussing the Florida
MOU).
154. But see supra note 89.
155. See supra Part I.C.
156. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976); see also supra Part I.A.
157. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982); De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355-57, 363 (1976).
158. See Jay T. Jorgensen, The Practical Power of State and Local Governments to
Enforce Federal Immigration Laws, 1997 BYU L. REV. 899, 908 (stating that the Ninth
Circuit applied the De Canas preemption analysis to the Gonzales facts). The cases in the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits were different because the issue concerned whether state law
enforcement officers were preempted from enforcing federal law, while the Supreme
Court's cases in De Canas and Plyler concerned state laws that concerned'immigration.
Compare Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983), and United States v.
Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999), with De Canas, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) and
Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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for determining when state enforcement infringes upon the federal
159
power.
The first De Canas prong is irrelevant to the circuits' opinions because
neither state was attempting to regulate immigration.' 6" The second De
Canas prong required explicit congressional intent to oust state power;
however, Plyler appeared to modify this requirement, implying that such
intent to preempt state power did not have to be explicitly stated.'
6
'
Based on these Supreme Court analyses, the Tenth Circuit's analysis of
congressional intent in Vasquez-Alvarez was inherently flawed.162  In
examining 8 U.S.C. § 1252c, the Vasquez-Alvarez court used one
Congressman's concern for a specific problem and unjustifiably extended
it to rationalize that the statute intended to oust a "perceived" federal
preemption of state enforcement.16  However, the plain words of
Representative Doolittle's comments illustrate that he intended to
change the existing federal limitation on state enforcement for the
narrow purpose of public safety.'T64 The concern that prompted
Representative Doolittle to sponsor the amendment was that "current
federal law prohibits state and local law enforcement officials from
arresting and detaining criminal aliens. '' 65 The Tenth Circuit, however,
159. See supra Part 1.B (enumerating the three prongs of the De Canas test and
discussing the Plyler decision). But see Jorgensen, supra note 158, at 911. In applying the
De Canas preemption analysis to the Gonzales facts, Jorgensen asserts that the Ninth
Circuit altered the De Canas prong to fit the enforcement context and joined its inquiry of
state and local immigration enforcement authority with the De Canas' analysis of
preemption in the regulatory context. Id.
160. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 355 (explaining the first prong as a query of whether the
law was a regulation of immigration).
161. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225-26.
162. See Waslin, supra note 137, at 8. Waslin asserts that the Tenth Circuit's reliance
on the Salinas-Calderon opinion in deciding Vasquez-Alvarez is unfounded because the
Salinas-Calderon court "did not define what it meant by an immigration violation and did
not discuss-or even appear to recognize-the difference between civil and criminal
immigration offenses." Id. The distinction between civil and criminal immigration
violations is important to determine whether the arresting officer had the requisite
probable cause to stop an undocumented alien. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d
468, 477 (9th Cir. 1983).
163. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1298. The only legislative history available for 8
U.S.C. § 1252c is "the floor debate on the amendment which took place in the House of
Representatives," during which Representative Doolittle described his purpose in
sponsoring the amendment. Id.
164. See id. In particular, Representative Doolittle stated, "current Federal law in this
area places our communities at risk and has led me to offer this amendment to H.R. 2703,
an amendment I feel will help put some sense back into our laws dealing with the re-entry
of criminal aliens into this country." Id.
165. Id. at 1298-99 (emphasis added). The law allowed local police only to "release
the felon and contact the INS with the details of the incident." Id. at 1298. Thus,
Doolittle's purpose in sponsoring the amendment was to create a congressional
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used Doolittle's statements to assert that Section 1252c eliminated a
falsely "perceived" federal limitation on all local immigration
enforcement.' 6 The court went a step further and claimed that Section
1252c was an additional source of enforcement authority, rather than a
limitation to it.'0 ' However, if Congress had understood the states to
have preexisting authority to make immigration arrests, it would not
have enumerated such specific requirements in Section 1252c.' 68 Thus,
Section 1252c was not amended to allow an additional means of state
enforcement to an already existing power; rather its purpose was to
delegate enforcement authority for the narrow purpose of arresting
"criminal aliens.', 6 9
The Ninth Circuit applied the second prong of the DeCanas test in
Gonzales in concluding that the criminal provisions were not
preempted. 70 Applying a test similar to Plyler's modification, the Court
inferred that Congress, by its "complex administrative structure,"
authorization for states to arrest "criminal aliens." Id. Representative Doolittle further
stated:
With my amendment, law enforcement officials would no longer be required to
release known dangerous felons back into our communities. Instead, this
amendment would give those with the responsibility of protecting our public
safety the ability to take a known criminal alien off our streets and put him
behind bars.
142 CONG. REC. H2191 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996) (statement of Rep. Doolittle).
166. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1299. In fact, Representative Doolittle's concern
was with "known dangerous felons," not all violators of immigration law. 142 CONG. REC.
H2191 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996) (statement of Rep. Doolittle).
167. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1298-1300. Vasquez-Alvarez claimed that evidence
of his arrest should have been suppressed because it did not comport with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252c. Id. at 1295. The court saved the evidence of the arrest from suppression by
claiming that Section 1252c was not the only way in which an officer could legally arrest an
undocumented immigrant. Id.
168. CHISHTI, supra note 4, at 84-85. Further, "[i]f state and local authorities did have
such authority, the new INA provisions would be superfluous." Id. at 85.
169. See 142 CONG. REC. H2191 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Doolittle).
170. Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Although the
regulation of immigration is unquestionably an exclusive federal power, it is clear that this
power does not preempt every state activity affecting aliens."): see also Jorgensen, supra
note 158, at 908 (stating that in Gonzales v. City of Peoria, the Ninth Circuit applied the
De Canas preemption analysis). Jorgensen, however, argues:
[TJhe question of whether state and local officers may enforce the INA is really a
two-part inquiry. First, a court must ask whether Congress has preempted state
and local enforcement of the federal law in question. Second, since state
governments have authority to control the activities of state and local officers, a
court must look to state law to determine if state and local officers are authorized
to enforce the federal provision.
Id. at 910.
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intended to preempt state civil immigration enforcement.' 7' The Ninth
Circuit's preemption analysis confirmed that state enforcement without
congressional delegation "breaches core federalism principles and the
established understanding of federal preemption in the immigration
field.' ' 7'  Thus, the Ninth Circuit correctly analyzed the question of
congressional intent, while the Tenth Circuit improperly expanded the
meaning of Section 1252c.
73
The Plyler Court modified the third De Canas prong, that state law
cannot act as an "obstacle" to federal policy, in declaring that state action
must "mirror[] federal objectives."'74  In Vasquez-Alvarez, the Tenth
Circuit's rationale plainly did not mirror federal objectives; instead, it
surpassed them.7 Representative Doolittle's comments made clear that
the federal objective in amending Section 1252c was authorizing local
police to arrest "criminal aliens" who threatened public safety.' 76 These
"federal objectives" did not include arrests of undocumented immigrants
who had not committed crimes.'77 The Vasquez-Alvarez court, however,
171. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474-75; see also Manheim, supra note 71, at 975-76
(asserting that in Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit "held that states could not enforce the civil
provisions of federal immigration law"). In addressing the situation in which local police
arrest an undocumented immigration, it is, as Manheim states:
[P]resuppose[d] that local [law enforcement] officials are competent to
determine immigration status. Whether an alien is "legal" or "illegal" depends
upon a variety of factors beyond mere definitions contained in the INA. For
instance, many persons without standard immigration documents may
nonetheless have a claim of right to residency, or may be in the process of
applying for asylum, adjustment of status, or relief from deportation. In addition
to these statutory routes for changed status, INS may simply use its discretion not
to act against an otherwise deportable alien.
Id. Manheim further asserts that establishing one's immigration status can involve "a
herculean task of reviewing voluminous documentation." Id. at 976. In fact, the INA is so
intricate that it is considered "second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity,"
and bears a "striking resemblance" to "Minos' Labyrinth in ancient Crete."' Id.
172. CHISHTI,supra note 4, at 80.
173. Waslin, supra note 137, at 8-9 (calling the Tenth Circuit's decisions "erroneou[s]"
and the DOJ's reliance on them "dubious, at best").
174. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982); DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363-364
(1976).
175. United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 1999); see also
Waslin, supra note 137, at 8. Waslin argued that the Vasquez-Alvarez court "relies only on
cases that authorize police enforcement of federal criminal offenses, and thus there is no
support for an expanded interpretation covering civil offenses." Id.
176. 142 CONG. REC. H2191 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996) (statement of Rep. Doolittle);
see also CHISHTI, supra note 4, at 84 (explaining that Doolittle's purpose in offering the
amendment was aimed specifically at criminal immigrants, not civil immigration violators).
177. See 142 CONG. REC. H2191 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Doolittle). In fact, the federal objectives included only "arresting and detaining criminal
aliens whom" local police encounter in their routine duties. Id.
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extended the "general authority to investigate" rationale from its
criminal context in Salinas-Calderon to civil enforcement. 78 The Tenth
Circuit unjustifiably extended this rationale without discussing the
critical difference between civil and criminal immigration provisions.'"
In stating that federal and state authorities have "identical purposes"
in preventing criminal immigration violations, the Ninth Circuit implied
that states do not share the federal goal of maintaining the "pervasive
regulatory scheme" of immigration laws." Further, the Gonzales court
suggested that state enforcement might create an obstacle to the federal
interest in the enforcement of civil provisions when it stated that "no
opportunity for state activity remains. ' '" 8' Thus, the Ninth Circuit
suggested that the civil provisions contain nothing inherently local, so
that no asserted state police power could mirror the objectives of the
federal power. 1
2
The previous opinions of the DOJ also recognize "the distinction
between the civil and criminal provisions of the INA for purposes of
state law enforcement authority.""' Those opinions, coupled with
Administrative actions consistent with that position, only serve to
bolster the concept that Congress intended to permit state enforcement
of immigration laws only in limited situations-when Congress delegates
arrest authority and when undocumented immigrants violate criminal
178. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d at 1296. The court not only cites the Salinas-Calderon
case to support its proposition that police have this general investigatory authority, but it
also cites the Ninth Circuit's Gonzales case, which did not extend the general authority to
the civil provisions. Id.; see also Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474-75 (9th Cir.
1983). It is unclear whether the Vasquez-Alvarez court based its decision on the
underlying criminal violation, or the arresting officer's perceived violation of a civil
provision. See Vasquez-Alvarez, 176 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999). It is possible that in citing
language from Salinas-Calderon, the Tenth Circuit extended enforcement authority from
criminal violations to civil immigration violations. See id. at 1296. If Vasquez-Alvarez did
extend the rationale, the Tenth Circuit would find that enforcement of the civil provisions
is within states' police powers. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 92, at 786-787 (noting that
the "interpretive tension" that this case caused remains unresolved).
179. See Waslin, supra note 137, at 8 (noting that the Salinas-Calderon court did not
acknowledge the difference between civil and criminal immigration laws); supra Part I.C
(identifying the distinction between criminal and civil provisions of immigration law as
discussed in Gonzales).
180. Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 474-75.
181. Id. at 474.
182. Id. (juxtaposing the "identical purposes" in criminal immigration enforcement
with the fact that the "system of federal regulation is so pervasive that no opportunity for
state activity remains").
183. E.g., OLC Opinion, supra note 85.
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immigration law or state laws."' Many local officials have long relied on
this concept as it clearly distinguishes the roles of local police from
federal officials.' "5
III. LOCAL POLICE SHOULD ONLY MAKE IMMIGRATION ARRESTS
WHEN NEEDED TO ALLEVIATE COMMUNITY CONCERNS
A. Maintaining Safe Communities Requires Police To Focus On Crime,
Not Immigration Violations
To protect their communities, local police should ignore the Attorney
General's appeal to make civil immigration arrests. 6  Many police
departments already refuse to enforce civil immigration laws because
they believe that "community policing" would decline.87 These police
departments contend that the community will become less safe if
undocumented immigrants stop reporting crimes because they fear
deportation."" Instead of seeking to arrest non-criminal immigrants,
state legislatures should follow Oregon's example of affirmatively
enacting legislation that prohibits police officers from making civil
immigration arrests.' 9
184. See Jorgensen, supra note 158, at 920 (stating that there is no preemption issue
when congressional intent clearly manifests that local police can enforce immigration
laws).
185. See Nat'l Immigration Forum, Opposition to Local Law Enforcement of
Immigration Laws (May 22, 2002) at http://www.immigrationforum.org/currentissues/
articles/052002-quotes.htm [hereinafter Nat'l Immigration Forum] (last visited Jan. 24,
2004). David Cohen, a spokesperson for the San Diego Police stated, "Our policy has
been and continues to be that we are not federal immigration officers, and our department
guidelines for dealing with undocumented persons are very strict and are unlikely to
change." Id.
186. See Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 2.
187. See generally Nat'l Immigration Forum, supra note 185 (presenting views of
various police departments around the country). In April 2002, in anticipation of the
announcement of the new policy, twenty-six police departments made statements
criticizing the policy. See id.
188. See also id. As Armando Mayoya of the San Joaquin County (CA) Sheriff's
Office stated, "[i]f police officers start reporting to the INS, more undocumented workers
could wind up as victims. Criminals soon would realize that undocumented workers would
be unlikely to call police for fear of being deported and target them for attacks." Id. See
also New York City's 'Sanctuary' Policy and the Effect of Such Policies on Public Safety,
Law Enforcement, and Immigration:Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, 108th Cong. (2003) ("In 1998,
Elena Gonzalez, an immigrant in New Jersey, was found murdered in the basement of her
apartment. Friends of the woman said that the suspected murderer, her former boyfriend,
threatened to report her to the INS if she did not do what she was told.").
189. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 92, at 792 n.88 ("Oregon law prohibits law
enforcement from apprehending 'any persons whose only violation of law is that they are
persons of foreign citizenship residing in the United States in violation of federal
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Alternatively, the states could adopt the policies like those of New
York City's Mayor Bloomberg, who signed an executive order stating
that law enforcement officers in his city may not inquire about a person's
immigration status, unless they are suspected of a crime. '9" Even absent a
state or municipal prohibition, police departments nevertheless should
refuse to make such arrests.'9 ' Contrary to proponents of the "inherent
authority" stance, these non-enforcement policies do not offer shelter for
criminal aliens. 92 Rather, these proactive initiatives send the message to
the immigrant community, and to the federal immigration authorities,
that local police departments are committed to the safety of their
populations and will not be hindered by a federal agenda.9'3
Immigration enforcement by local police not only undermines
community safety, it also harms the national interest in preventing
terrorism. 94 If forced to focus on an immigrant's status, rather than his
criminal conduct, police departments risk overlooking potential
terrorism threats by concentrating instead on more trivial violations, such
as dropping below the minimum credit hours required to maintain a
student visa.'95 The federal government depends on local police as the
immigration laws'.") (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850 (2001)). Alaska has a similar
statute. See Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003 (CLEAR
Act): Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2671, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, 108th Cong. 38 (2003)[hereinafter
CLEAR Act Legislative Hearing] (statement of Gordon Quan, Member, City Council,
Houston, Texas), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/89636.PDF).
190. New York City, Exec. Order No. 41, City-Wide Privacy Policy and Amendment
of Executive Order No. 34 Relating to City Policy Concerning Immigrant Access to City
Services (Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 41]. The text states that "Law
enforcement officers shall not inquire about a person's immigration status unless
investigating illegal activity other than mere status as an undocumented alien." Id. § 4(a).
191. See Nat'l Immigration Forum, supra note 185. Assistant Police Chief Rudy
Landeros of the Austin, Texas, Police Department stated, "Our officers will not, and let
me stress this because it is very important, our officers will not stop, detain or arrest
anybody solely based on their immigration status. Period." Id.
192. See Press Release, Michael R. Bloomberg, Mayor, New York City, Mayor
Michael R. Bloomberg Signs Executive Order 41 Regarding City Services for Immigrants
(Sept. 17, 2003). Mayor Bloomberg stated that "[t]he promise of confidentiality is not for
everyone, only for those who abide by the law. It offers no protection to terrorists and
violent criminals who seek to avoid responsibility for their crimes. Nor is it a shield for
law-breakers to hide behind." Id.
193. See Exec. Order No. 41, supra note 190, § 4(c) ("it shall be the policy of the Police
Department not to inquire about the immigration status of crime victims, witnesses, or
others who call or approach the police seeking assistance.").
194. Waslin supra note 134, at 15-16; CLEAR Act Legislative Hearing, supra note 189,
at 40 (statement of Gordon Quan, Member, City Council, Houston, Texas).
195. James M. Lindsay & Audrey Singer, Local Police Should Not Do an I.N.S. Job,
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2002, at A31. The article states:
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first defense against terrorism; however, asking them to exhaust their
resources investigating the eight million undocumented immigrants
currently in the United States will hinder terrorism investigations by
diverting police from their everyday enforcement responsibilities. 9 6 By
prioritizing the safety of their communities over civil immigration
violations, local police actions conform to the federal preemption
principle that states should exercise their police powers primarily for
local concerns.197
B. Civil Immigration Arrests Create Liability for Police Departments
In addition to fostering unsafe communities, participation in
immigration enforcement leaves local police departments vulnerable to
the high costs of litigation.'9" Without the training that federal officials
receive, local police may make arrests on the basis of ethnicity, without
probable cause.' 99 Such improper arrests spurred litigation in Chandler,
[I]t is doubtful that turning state and local police loose on illegal immigrants will
do much to stop terrorism .... State and local police probably would not have
prevented Sept. 11 even if they had been empowered to enforce immigration
laws. The 19 hijackers all entered the United States legally, and 17 of them still
had valid visas on Sept. 11.
Id.; see Tramonte, supra note 93. Jeanne Butterfield, Executive Director of the American
Immigration Lawyers Association said, "A terrorist does not need to overstay his visa to
carry out his plans, and will not likely show up at the INS to register himself as the Justice
Department might want him to." Id. Law enforcement should not base their search for
terrorists on country of origin. Victor C. Romero, Decoupling "Terrorist" from
"Immigrant:" An Enhanced Role for the Federal Courts Post 9/11, 7 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 201, 206 (2003). Romero stated:
Targeting certain groups is overinclusive because interrogating and detaining
thousands of noncitizens based on accidents of birth offends our notions of
liberal equality and individual civil rights. It is also underinclusive because, as
mentioned before, there are U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals who may
also be terrorist threats.
Id.
196. See supra note 195.
197. See supra Part I.B (discussing the validity of states' asserted police powers and
when it overcomes a preemption challenge).
198. See Waslin supra note 137, at 16. One lawsuit in Chandler, Arizona, stemming
from the local police's improper arrest of undocumented immigrants resulted in a
settlement of $400,000. Id.; see Lazos Vargas, supra note 92, at 821-22; Tramonte, supra
note 93.
199. Waslin, supra note 137, at 9-13; see also Bureau of Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, Core Occupations, at
http:l/www.immigration.gov/graphics/workfor/careers/core.htm#ia (last modified Jan. 21,
2002). Federal immigration agents are federally trained in immigration law, alien removal
process and procedures, fraudulent document detection, constitutional law, civil liberties
and liabilities. Id.; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887
(1975)("Mexican appearance.., does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if
they are aliens"); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 477 (9th Cir. 1983) ("If the
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Arizona, when police conducted a city-wide immigration raid in 1997. ""
The Chandler police unconstitutionally stopped people based on their
Hispanic appearance and use of the Spanish language; these
infringements cost the city $400,000 in settlements."" Like Chandler,
other cities and states remain susceptible to lawsuits because courts
review their constitutional infringements in the immigration arena with a
strict scrutiny standard, while courts use a rational basis standard to
review federal enforcement. Thus, the Chandler, Arizona incident
serves as a reminder to all police departments that when local police act
outside of their jurisdiction-even under the direction of federal
immigration agents-they can become subject to civil rights liability and
2113lose the trust of the community.
C. Congressional Legislation Would Only Aggravate the Issues
Proponents of the Justice Department's "inherent authority" stance
have proposed the CLEAR Act, which could become the first
congressional statute to declare that local police have the inherent
authority to enforce immigration law." Many police departments have
seizure involves anything more than the brief and narrowly-defined intrusion ... it must
be justified by probable cause."). Lazos Vargas points out that the "zeal to enforce
immigration laws could lead unwittingly to racial profiling". Lazos Vargas, supra note 92,
at 821. Lazos Vargos quotes Sheriff Ralph Lopez of San Antonio, who "puts the issue in
this way: 'what are we saying? "Hey you've got an accent. Let me see your passport." It
damn near leads us to racial profiling."' Id.
200. Waslin, supra note 137, at 12; see also Tramonte, supra note 93. Tramonte stated:
[T]he most notorious incident involved a joint local police-INS operation that
took place in Chandler, Arizona in 1997. During a raid, Chandler law
enforcement agents ... stopp[ed] people they suspected of being undocumented
immigrants and often verbally or physically abus[ed] them. The officers
reportedly did not consider "probable cause" to believe that a criminal violation
had been committed.
Id.
201. Lazos Vargas, supra note 92, at 796-97; Waslin, supra note 137, at 12-13 (2003);
Tramonte, supra note 93.
202. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens."); supra Part I.B (discussing Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365 (1971)).
203. See Waslin, supra note 137, at 13 ("Chandler police acted outside of their
jurisdiction and attempted to enforce immigration law."); Michael A. Fletcher, Police in
Arizona Accused of Civil Rights Violations; Lawsuit Cites Sweep Aimed at Illegal
Immigrants, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1997, at A14.
204. See Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act, H.R.
2671, 108th Cong. (2003). As the ACLU stated, "[d]espite its title, the CLEAR Act seeks
to entangle local police officers with the enforcement of civil, not criminal, violations of
federal immigration law." CLEAR Act Legislative Hearing, supra note 189, at 108. See
also, Nat'l Immigration Forum, The CLEAR Act, at http://www.immigrationforum.org/
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criticized the CLEAR Act out of concern that it would result in unsafe
communities and increased racial profiling."5 In addition, the CLEAR
Act would force states to adopt policies that require police to report
undocumented immigrants to federal authorities; this would force
communities in Oregon and New York City to repeal their sanctuary
206policies, or else face revocation of federal funding.
currentissues/clear.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004). The CLEAR Act would mandate that
local police investigate students who have "dropped from full-time to part-time status,
individuals who have remained in the U.S. longer than the date on their tourist visa allows,
or businesses that have hired immigrants without legal papers." Id.
205. See Nat'l Immigration Forum, The CLEAR Act: Dangerous Public Policy
According to Police, Local Governments, Opinion Leaders and Communities, available at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/currentissues/clear.htm (last viisted Jan. 28, 2004).
Police spokespersons from many cities with large immigrant populations have spoken
against the bill. Id. The Commissioner of the Boston Police Department criticized the
CLEAR Act in a letter to Senator Kennedy. Id. Boston (MA) Police Department
Commissioner Paul Evans stated, "[t]he Boston Police Department . . . [has] worked
diligently to gain the trust of immigrant residents .... By turning all police officers into
immigration agents, the CLEAR Act will discourage immigrants from coming forward to
report crimes and suspicious activity, making our streets less safe as a result." Id. The
CLEAR Act's potential effects on community policing and racial profiling are similar to
the effects that would result in those communities that choose to adhere to Ashcroft's
policy. See supra, Part Il.A-B; CLEAR Act Legislative Hearing, supra note 189, at 110
(statement from the ACLU). The ACLU stated:
Any benefits that might result from enlisting state and local police to enforce
complex federal immigration laws would be far outweighed by the serious
consequences of such a change. A wholesale reversal of policies that separate
immigration enforcement from local law enforcement would (1) harm the civil
rights and civil liberties of immigrant communities and lead to widespread racial
profiling, (2) harm public safety by driving a wedge between immigrant
communities and the police who serve and protect them, (3) harm our federal
system by authorizing state and local police to enforce a civil federal regulatory
scheme, and (4) complicate President Bush's stated position of supporting state
and local enforcement only in certain "narrow" circumstances said to be related
to terrorism.
Id.; see also The Nat'l Immigration Forum, The CLEAR Act, at
http://www.immigrationforum.org/currentissues/clear.htm ("[W]hen immigrants begin to
see local police as agents of the federal government, with the power to deport them or
their family members, they are less likely to approach local law enforcement with tips on
crimes or suspicious activity.").
206. CLEAR Act, H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. § 102 (2003). See CLEAR Act Legislative
Hearing, supra note 189, at 38 (statement from Gordon Quan, Mayor Pro Tem, Houston,
Texas). Quan stated:
Section 102 of H.R. 2671 would require state and local governments to pass laws
authorizing their law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration laws or
risk losing reimbursement from the federal government for costs related to the
incarceration of illegal immigrants. Put simply, Section 102 would preempt state
and local laws that bar their law enforcement officers from assuming the federal
responsibility of enforcing immigration laws.
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Two conservatives, David Keene, Chairman of the American
Conservative Union, and Grover Norquist, President of Americans for
Tax Reform, would call such a law a nationalization of local law
enforcement.27  They wonder "[i]f local police are to enforce our
immigration laws, will they soon be required to seek out and apprehend
those who violate our environmental laws, or the Americans with
Disabilities Act as well? ' ' 21 18 Additionally, Keene and Norquist allude to
another federalism issue: whether such an action would constitute a
form of commandeering. 2'0 Currently, Ashcroft merely encourages
police to adopt his proposal."" Federal legislation, however, may
command local police to make civil immigration arrests. 21' Such
legislation could amount to "commandeering" of state officials.2  Even if
Id.; see also National Immigration Forum, Summary of Clear Law Enforcement for
Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003, Nat'l Immigration Forum, available at
http://www.immigrationforum.orglcurrentissues/clear.htm. Those states that refuse to
enact such laws will be "ineligible for federal funding under [the INA]." Id.
207. Eric Schmitt, Two Conservatives Tell Bush They Oppose Plan for Police, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2002, A24.
208. Id.
209. Id. In asking whether local police will be "required" to perform federal tasks,
Keene and Norquist imply that such action might breach federalism principles. See id.; See
Lazos Vargas, supra note 92, at 781-82 (arguing that forcing law enforcement to enforce
immigration law can be considered commandeering).
210. Ashcroft Remarks, supra note 2 ("We are asking state and local police to
undertake [this mission] voluntarily."). Some police departments, however, interpret
Ashcroft's invitation as more of an order. See Nat'l Immigration Forum, supra note 185.
San Antonio Police Chief Albert Ortiz stated, "Any time we get mandates and more work
without a commensurate amount of resources, something has to suffer. If that [mandate]
happens ... [it] would be a setback [for the community]." Id. Whatcom County (WA)
Sheriff Dale Brandland declared, "[The federal government has been trying to get us to do
this] for years." Id.
211. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that forcing a state
agency to adopt a federal program amounts to "commandeering"). Under Printz,
commandeering occurs when the federal government "conscript[s] state officers" directly.
Id. at 925. Printz held unconstitutional a federal statute that commanded "state and local
law enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers." Id. at 902.
212. See id. at 925. The federal government may encourage states to enforce
immigration laws, but it is prohibited by the anti-commandeering jurisprudence laid down
in Printz and New York v. United States from mandating that states enforce immigration
laws. Id.; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the federal
government may not commandeer a state legislature to enact federally-mandated
regulatory programs); see also Jorgensen, supra note 158, at 926. In Printz, the federal
government attempted to argue that enlisting local officials in the federal task was most
practical. Printz, 521 U.S. at 931-32. The federal government pointed out that "[t]he
Brady Act serves very important purposes, is most efficiently administered by [local
officials] during the interim period, and places a minimal and only temporary burden upon
state officers." Id. at 931-32. This unsuccessful rationale is very similar to the possible
rationales the Bush Administration might give for enlisting local police in the enforcement
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such legislation does not make local enforcement mandatory, it might
encourage local police to adopt a more widespread approach than
Ashcroft's suggested "narrow anti-terrorism mission."23  This would
result in more unconstitutional arrests and unsafe communities. 4
IV. CONCLUSION
Tightening immigration laws and monitoring undocumented
immigrants is an important goal of the federal government. ' Fighting
the war on terrorism is also a top priority.1 6 The two issues should not be
mistaken as one.2' 7 If community safety and national security are truly
top priorities, local police should focus on preventing criminal acts,
rather than enforcing civil immigration violations. The announcement
of immigration law. In particular, the Administration most likely finds that enforcing
immigration law "serves [an] important purpose" in combating terrorism; that it would be
"most efficient" for local law enforcement to participate as they number 650,000; and is
only a "temporary burden" for the narrow anti-terrorism mission. See generally Ashcroft
Remarks, supra note 2. However, as Printz warned against 'expedient solution[s] to the
crisis of the day,' the federal government, in its attempts to get through the crisis of today,
is encroaching on the principles of federalism by potentially commandeering state officers.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 157). The
CLEAR Act avoids the problem of commanding state officials by relying on the taxing
and spending power. Under Section 102 of the CLEAR Act, if the states do not enact the
statute mandating local police to arrest undocumented immigrants, the federal
government will take away the federal funding that it provides to the states under the INA
§ 241(i). See Nat'l Immigration Forum of 2003, Summary of Clear Law Enforcement for
Criminal Alien Removal Act, available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/currentissues/
clear.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2004).
213. See, e.g., CLEAR Act Legislative Hearing, supra note 186, at 110 ("President
Bush's stated preference for a 'narrow' use of the NCIC would be completely undermined
by a wholesale reversal of state and local government policies that generally prohibit their
officers from enforcing immigration laws.").
214. See Nat'l Immigration Forum, supra note 185. The comments of Police Chief
Theron Bowman of Arlington, Texas summarizes these problems with an emphatic refusal
to make immigration arrests. See id. Bowman states, "[w]e can't and won't throw our
scarce resources at quasi-political, vaguely criminal, constitutionally questionable, nor any
other evolving issues or unfunded mandates that aren't high priorities with our citizenry."
id.
215. The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) Interior Enforcement
Strategy: Hearing Before House Comm. on the Judiciary the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims, 107th Cong. 9 (2002) (statement of Joseph R. Greene,
Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service)
("[T]he INS' responsibilities include identifying convicted criminal aliens and processing
them for deportation; investigating immigration crimes; and auditing and identifying
employers and employees who have violated immigration laws.").
216. See id. at 7-8 ("The tragic events of Septeber 11, 2001, have placed even greater
demands and challenges upon [INS] agents to combat terrorism].").
217. See supra note 195.
218. Id.
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that local police have the "inherent authority" to make immigration
arrests encourages officers to leave the sphere of inherently local
concerns and subject their communities to less police protection and
• 21')
more civil liberties infringements. As local police traditionally have
refrained from making civil immigration arrests, they should continue to
ensure community safety by arresting only those immigrants who have
committed a crime, and they should leave civil enforcement to the
properly trained federal officers.21
219. See supra Parts III.A and III.B.
220. See supra Part III.A.
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